This thesis investigates the distributive effects of a public agency's contract decisions in order to answer the question: "Who wins government contracts and why?". In the thesis, I develop a multivariate regression model to provide an in-depth analysis of the economic and political factors that may influence government officials when they make contract award decisions. I use a general research model to investigate two competing explanations: (1) the policy model where the low-bidder wins the contract or (2) the self-interest model where a politically favored contractor wins the contract. Twenty-one variables measure the influence of the policy model's five economic factors: financial aspects of the firm and contract, low-bid position, price and CPI, competition, and the firm's pricing tactics. Twenty-seven variables measure the influence of the self-interest model's five political factors: ward location, political value of era, change in elected and appointed officials, administrative review time, and contract justification. (Volume 1 of 2)